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Abstract— The paper considers the problem of detecting
cyber-attacks occurring in communication networks for dis-
tributed control schemes. A distributed methodology is pro-
posed to detect the presence of malicious attacks aimed at com-
promising the stability of large-scale interconnected systems and
multi-agent systems governed by consensus-based controllers.
Only knowledge of the local model is required. The detectability
properties of the proposed method are analyzed. A class of
undetectable attacks is identified. Preliminary simulation results
show the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
In modern engineering systems, physical processes, com-
putational resources and communication networks are inte-
grated. Examples of systems of this kind, often called Cyber-
Physical Systems [1], range from Large-Scale Systems (LSS)
such as critical infrastructure systems, including electrical
grids, water distribution systems, traffic networks, industrial
control systems, etc., to autonomous vehicles and unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), which are described in the literature
as multi-agent systems [2]. A common feature of these
systems is that they can be described as the result of interac-
tion, either physical or cyber, of multiple subsystems. When
dealing with these kind of systems, centralized architectures
for control and monitoring are neither feasible nor reliable
due to communication and computational constraints. This
has led to the development of distributed [3] and decentral-
ized [4] architectures, in which local agents compute local
regulation strategies to achieve global properties. One of the
global properties which may be desirable is the ability of
different subsystems to achieve consensus on the value of
some state variables [5], [6]. Examples of systems which
This work has been supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020
research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 739551
(KIOS CoE). This work has been conducted as part of the research
project Stability and Control of Power Networks with Energy Storage
(STABLE-NET) funded by the RCUK Energy Programme (contract no:
EP/L014343/1), and has received support from the Swiss National Science
Foundation under the COFLEX project (grant number 200021-169906).
F. Boem is with the Dept. of Electrical and Electronic Engineer-
ing at the Imperial College London, UK, and with the KIOS Re-
search and Innovation Centre of Excellence, University of Cyprus.
(f.boem@imperial.ac.uk)
A.J. Gallo is with the Dept. of Electrical and Elec-
tronic Engineering at the Imperial College London, UK.
(alexander.gallo12@imperial.ac.uk)
G. Ferrari-Trecate is with the Automatic Control Labo-
ratory, cole Polytechnique de Lausanne (EPFL), Swizerland.
(giancarlo.ferraritrecate@epfl.ch)
T. Parisini is with the Dept. of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
at the Imperial College London, UK, with the KIOS Research and In-
novation Centre of Excellence, University of Cyprus and also with the
Dept. of Engineering and Architecture at University of Trieste, Italy.
(t.parisini@gmail.com)
are regulated by this type of control strategy can be found
in voltage and current regulation in DC microgrids [7],
[8], [9], in cooperative control of UAVs and in formation
control of autonomous vehicles [10]. In order to achieve
these objectives, it is necessary for the local agents to
communicate with each other. This, however, could make
these systems vulnerable to the presence of attacks [11], [12].
Security of control systems is a topic which has attracted
considerable interest in the literature in recent years [13],
[14], [15], [16], [17], [18]. Most of the works about security
of control systems consider centralized architectures. In the
context of consensus protocols, [11] studies methods for
cyber-attack detection, but requires knowledge of the global
model to perform monitoring and detection. To the best
of the authors‘ knowledge, the present paper is the first
contribution proposing a distributed method to detect attacks
in the communication network for the distributed control of
interconnected systems.
Some distributed and decentralized methods for fault de-
tection have been recently proposed [19], [20], [21], [22],
[23], [24]. Most of the works for multi-agent systems assume
that each agent knows the entire topology of the network
connecting the agents (see [25] as example), thus requiring
the knowledge of the global model. On the other hand, the
proposed approach only requires information which is locally
available or communicated by neighboring agents and the
knowledge of the local model.
The main contribution of this paper is the design of a fully
distributed model-based detection architecture for attacks
in the communication network between subsystems which
are physically interconnected, and which are regulated by
a distributed consensus protocol. The proposed detection
architecture can be performed locally by each subsystem
through a local diagnoser. Furthermore, we analyze the
conditions under which the detectability of the attacks is
guaranteed, and, on the other hand, what properties the attack
must have for it not to be detectable by the proposed strategy.
In this paper, we re-apprise the threshold-based distributed
fault detection schemes proposed in [26] in the context of
detection of cyber-attacks. However, we adapt these ideas
to a novel scenario. Compared to our previous works on
distributed fault detection, in this paper we consider a
framework where each subsystem is governed by a two-layer
controller, where primary control is devoted to stabilization
and secondary control is based on a consensus dynamics
for driving some outputs to a common value. Differently
to previous papers, here cyber-attacks are modeled as faults
on the communication links. Furthermore, in this paper
we develop a threshold-based local detection scheme and
analyze detectability of cyber-attacks even when a subsystem
is simultaneously affected by multiple attacks. In this novel
scenario, the detectability analysis offers a framework to
analyze when a combination of attacks is stealthy. Finally,
some preliminary results on the design of the consensus layer
for counteracting stealthy attacks are provided.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a LSS composed of N linear interconnected sub-
systems Σi, i ∈ N = {1, ..., N}, modeled by the following
discrete-time equations:
x+[i] = Aiix[i] +
∑
j∈Ni
Aijx[j] +Biu[i] +Mid[i] +Giv[i] + w[i]
y[i] = x[i] + ρ[i],
(1)
where x[i] ∈ Rni and y[i] ∈ Rni are the local state and output
vectors, and x+[i] represents the state at time t+1; u[i] ∈ Rmi
and v[i] ∈ Rpi are the primary and secondary control
inputs; d[i] ∈ Roi is a known exogenous input variable.
Matrix Aii ∈ Rni×ni is the local state transition matrix;
Bi ∈ Rni×mi , Gi ∈ Rni×li and Mi ∈ Rni×oi are the pri-
mary, secondary and exogenous input transition matrices, re-
spectively; Aij ∈ Rni×nj describes the physical coupling be-
tween subsystems i and j ∈ Ni, where the set Ni collects the
parent subsystems of Σi: Ni = {j ∈ N|∂x+[i]/∂x[j] 6= 0}. In
(1), w[i] represents process noise and uncertainties, including
those due to interconnections. We assume that all states vari-
ables are accessible but the measurements y[i] are affected by
a noise term ρ[i]. The following assumption is then required.
Assumption 1: The process uncertainty and the measure-
ment noise functions w[i](·) and ρ[i](·) are unknown and
bounded component-by-component by some known bounds:
w[i](t) ≤ w¯[i](t) , ρ[i](t) ≤ ρ¯[i](t) , ∀t ≥ 0. /
We consider a hierarchical control architecture with the
double objective of maintaining local stability of (1) and
achieving consensus of some state variables among the
subsystems of the LSS. This formulation is motivated by
different application examples, such as multi-agent systems
[10] and microgrids [7], [9].
Primary control input u[i] is a decentralized output feed-
back with gain matrix Ki ∈ Rmi×ni designed so that
(Aii +BiKi) is Schur stable. It can be computed as
u[i] = Kiy[i]. (2)
Secondary control is based on a linear consensus protocol.
To this end, we define a directed graph G, with vertex set
V , and edge set E ⊂ V × V . In this paper, the topology of
the digraph G corresponds to the underlying physical inter-
connections of the LSS. Hence, each node in V represents
a subsystem of the LSS, and edge (i, j) ∈ E if and only
if j ∈ Ni. We assume the communication network has the









where αij ∈ Rpi×ni is the consensus-weighting matrix. It
is defined such that the block matrix α = [αij ],∀i, j ∈
N , α ∈ RN¯×N¯ , N¯ = ∑Ni=1 ni, is a consensus matrix, i.e.
it is row-stochastic and primitive [27], in order to guarantee
that there exists an equilibrium realizing the consensus of the
output variables. This implies that G is strongly connected.
Vector y˜[j] ∈ Rnj in (3) denotes the output y[j] received by
the subsystem i from the neighboring subsystem j through
a communication link of the communication infrastructure
of the secondary control system. The communication link
corresponding to the arc (i, j) is modeled as
y˜[j](t) = y[j](t) + βj(t− Ta[j])φ[j](t) , (4)
where the term βj(t− Ta[j])φ[j](t) denotes the effect on the
received vector y˜[j](t) of a possible attack. Specifically, the
activation function βj(t − Ta[j]) is a function of time such
that βj(t−Ta[j]) = 0, t < Ta[j] βj(t−Ta[j]) = 1 for t ≥ Ta[j]
(that is, before Ta[j] the attacker either does not have access
to the communication link, or has not begun the attack). The
function φ[j](t) : R+ → Rnj denotes the actual effect of the
attack on the communication link which, in turn, affects the
consensus protocol (possibly harming it).
Assumption 2: Possible attacks affect only communica-
tion links of the secondary control system transmitting
information between neighboring subsystems according to
Eqs. (3) and (4). It is assumed that local measurements used
in the primary control system cannot be accessed by an
attacker (see Eqs. (1) and (2)). /
III. ATTACK DETECTION ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we design a distributed attack detection
architecture in which only the knowledge of the local model is
needed and aiming at locally detecting the presence of attacks
in the communication links between neighboring subsystems
in the secondary consensus control scheme.
A. Distributed State Estimator
Each subsystem is equipped with a local diagnoser com-
puting a local estimate of its state based on the knowledge of
the local system dynamics (1), as well as the measurements
that it receives from its neighbors. The local estimation
model evolves according to the following equations:
Σˆi : xˆ
+
[i] = Aiixˆ[i] +
∑
j∈Ni







where matrix Li ∈ Rni×ni is such that matrix
ALi = Aii − Li is Schur stable.
B. Detection threshold
We now design the local attack detection threshold. To
do this, we first analyze the estimation error, defined as
[i] = x[i] − xˆ[i]. The dynamics of the estimation error under
healthy conditions, i.e. for time t < Ta[j] ,∀j ∈ Ni, are given
using (1) and (5) as:
+[i] = ALi[i] +
∑
j∈Ni
Aijρ[j] + w[i] − Liρ[i] (6)
Note that system (6) is BIBO stable, and that its solution










ALi is Schur stable, there exist constants γi > 0 and λi ∈
[0, 1) such that
‖AtLi‖ ≤ γiλti,
where operator ‖ ·‖ is the matrix norm. Given Assumption 1
and exploiting the triangle inequality, it is possible to define











j∈Ni ‖Aij‖ρ¯[j](t) + w¯[i](t) + ‖Li‖ρ¯[i](t),
and ¯[i](0) is properly defined. As the threshold in (7) is
generated using the triangle inequality, it guarantees the ab-
sence of false alarms. It is worth noting that the update of the
estimation error bound requires only local communication
from neighboring subsystems.
We now formulate the attack detection threshold bounding
the residual r[i](t) = y[i](t)−yˆ[i](t) = [i](t)+ρ[i](t),∀t ≥ 0.
Hence the time-varying detection threshold is defined as
r¯[i](t) = ¯[i](t) + ρ¯[i](t) . (8)
The detection threshold r¯[i](t) given in (8) guarantees that
|r[i](t)| ≤ r¯[i](t) (9)
when no attacks affect the secondary control system.
Therefore, the local detection algorithm relies on checking
whether condition (9) is (locally) satisfied. It is sufficient that
|r[i,k](t)| > r¯[i,k](t)
for at least one component k ∈ {1, ..., ni} at time t = Td to
affirm that an attack has occurred in at least one of the output
measurements received from the neighboring subsystems.
C. Detectability
In this section, the detectability properties of the proposed
methodology are analyzed. The proofs are omitted due to
space constraints. We start by considering the presence of a
single attack φ[ˆ](·) affecting the measurements received by
subsystem i from one of its neighbors ˆ ∈ Ni.
Proposition 1: Consider subsystem Σi, with dynamics as
in (1), the distributed estimator (5), the detection threshold
(8), and an attack with activation function βˆ(t − Ta) =
1, t ≥ Ta. It is sufficient that






∣∣∣∣∣ > 2r¯[i](τ). (10)
for the attack sequence
[
φ[ˆ](Ta), . . . , φ[ˆ](τ)
]
to be de-
tectable by the attack detection logic based on threshold (8).

In Proposition 1, a class of attacks which may be de-
tectable by their cumulative effect is defined in a non-closed
form. The following – possibly conservative – sufficient
condition provides a more explicit condition for detectability
depending on the effect of the attack at a specific time instant.
Proposition 2: Consider subsystem Σi, with dynamics as
in (1), the distributed estimator (5), the detection threshold
(8), and an attack with activation function βˆ(t − Ta) =
1, t ≥ Ta. It is sufficient that
∃τ ≥ Ta :
∣∣φ[ˆ](τ)∣∣ > 2r¯[i](τ) (11)
for the attack input φ[ˆ](τ) to be detectable by the proposed
detection logic at time t = τ .

We now analyze the case in which the attacker has access
to multiple communication lines entering Σi, and thus alters
measurements y˜[j](t), j ∈ N̂i ⊆ Ni, where N̂i is the set
of neighboring subsystems whose communication links have
been attacked. We denote with φ[j∈N̂i] the combination of
attacks φ[j] affecting nodes j ∈ N̂i.
Proposition 3: Consider subsystem Σi, with dynamics as
in (1), distributed estimator (5), detection threshold (8), and
an attack on communication channels j ∈ N̂i with activation
functions βj(t− Ta) = 1, t ≥ Ta. It is sufficient that










for the attack sequences
[
φ[j](Ta), . . . , φ[j](τ)
]
, j ∈ N̂i to
be detectable by the detection logic based on (8). 
Finally, similarly as the case of an attack on a single com-
munication channel, a more explicit detectability condition
is given below for the multiple-attack case.
Proposition 4: Consider subsystem Σi, with dynamics as
in (1), the distributed estimator (5), the detection threshold
(8), and an attack on multiple communication channels with
activation functions βj(t − Ta) = 1, t ≥ Ta, ∀j ∈ N̂i.
Suppose that





∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 2r¯[i](τ) (13)
Then, the attack input φ[j](τ), j ∈ N̂i is detected by the
attack detection logic at time τ .

D. Class of stealthy attacks
In the following proposition, a condition on the attack
functions φ[j], j ∈ N̂i is given so that it is guaranteed that
their effect is not detectable by the proposed method. It
is worth noting that this attack assumes that the attacker
perfectly knows the coupling matrices Aij .
Theorem 1: Consider subsystem Σi, with dynamics as in
(1), the distributed estimator (5), the detection threshold
(8), and an attack on multiple communication channels with




∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0,∀τ ≥ Ta[j] (14)
then the attacks are not detectable by the attack detection
logic based on the threshold (8).

The proof is omitted due to space constraints.
The class of attacks satisfying (14), even if not detectable,
causes a non-zero effect on the dynamics of the local state








and, in general αij 6= Aij . It is hence possible for attack
functions to be such that (9) is satisfied ∀t ≥ 0, whilst
resulting in a non-zero effect on the secondary input value.
In the next section, we analyze the effect that attack func-
tions which are guaranteed not detectable have on subsystem
dynamics, and we provide some notes on how the consensus
protocol may be designed such that this effect is mitigated.
E. Remarks on the design of the consensus layer for coun-
teracting stealthy attacks
We analyze the effect on Σi caused by an attack function
φ¯[j∈N̂i] designed to be undetectable, i.e. to satisfy (14). We
consider two trajectories of system (1) affected by the same
noises: x˜[i] represents a nominal trajectory without attacks,
while x˜a[i] is affected by malicious attacks φ¯[j∈N̂i] after
t > Ta[j] . We note that x˜[i](t) = x˜
a
[i](t), for 0 ≤ t ≤ Ta[j] .
We introduce a mismatch vector, ˜[i] = x˜a[i] − x˜[i](t), which
describes the effect of the attack on the state trajectory.
Therefore the dynamics of ˜[i] are given by:
˜+[i] = Aii˜[i] +Gi˜v[i] (15)
where ˜v[i] = v˜
a
[i]− v˜[i] represents the difference between the
consensus inputs with and without attacks, and its dynamics
are given by (3) as




Note that it is assumed that values w[i](t) and ρ[i](t) are the
same for x˜a[i] and x˜[i] for all t ≥ 0. The satisfaction of (14)
is equivalent to
col(φ¯[j](t)|j ∈ N̂i) ∈ ker
([
Aij1 , . . . , Aij|N̂i|
])
where col(φ¯[j](t)|j ∈ N̂i) ∈ Rni|N̂i| is a column vector
collecting the attack functions acting on the i-th subsystem
at time t. Hence, since from (16) we know that the attack






Fig. 1: Example large-scale system. Σi are the subsystems
of the LSS, and the arrows represent both physical and
communication links between the subsystems.
would like to design the consensus weights in such a way
that if φ¯[j∈N̂i] satisfies (14), it also holds that
col(φ¯[j]|j ∈ N̂i) ∈ ker([αij1 , . . . , αij|N̂i| ])
Hence, it is advisable to develop a design procedure for the
consensus weights αij such that
ker
(




Aij1 , . . . , Aij|Ni|
])
holds for all i ∈ N . In the simulations section, we show a
preliminary result in a specific simulation example where the
consensus weights are designed to make the system resilient
to undetected attacks.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
Consider a large-scale system composed of N = 5
subsystems, which are interconnected as in Figure 1. Each























α12 = [0.5I2] , α14 = [0.5I2] , α21 = [0.5I2] , α23 = [0.1I2] ,
α25 = [0.4I2] , α31 = [0.6I2] , α32 = [0.4I2] , α41 = [0.4I2] ,
α45 = [0.6I2] , α52 = [0.5I2] , α54 = [0.5I2] ,
state interconnections can be seen in Figure 1, and
Mi = 0. Both the process disturbance w[i](t) and
the measurement noise ρ[i](t) are modeled as uniform
distributions bounded by w¯[i] = [0.03, 0.01]>,∀i ∈
N ,∀t ≥ 0, and ρ¯[i] = [0.03, 0.01]>,∀i, ∀t ≥ 0,
respectively. The initial conditions x[i](0) are as
follows: x[1](0) = [0.4464,−0.4382]>, x[2](0) =
[0.3678,−0.3929]>, x[3](0) = [−0.2886, 0.2462]>, x[4] =
[0.4183, 0.4615]>, x[5] = [−0.3842, 0.0556]>.
A. Detectability analysis
We start by presenting the results obtained by the proposed
distributed detection strategy in the case of an attacker
which has access to a single communication line linking
the subsystems. Specifically, we consider that the attacker
is able to modify output signal y[1](t) transmitted from
Σ1 to Σ2. We firstly show the effect of a constant attack
occurring abruptly at time Ta[1] = 35. The attack function
TABLE I: Results of 200 simulations with abrupt attacks
Number of times
c Avg(Td) σ(Td) detection failed
0.05 109 42 102
0.075 49 13 0
0.1 39 3 0
0.125 37 1 0
0.15 36 0.5 0
0.175 36 0.2 0
≥ 0.2 36 0 0
TABLE II: Results of 200 simulations with gradual attacks
Number of times
c Avg(Td) σ(Td) detection failed
0.05 112 44 107
0.075 50 14 0
0.1 39 3 0
0.125 37 1 0
0.15 36 0.5 0
0.175 36 0.2 0
≥ 0.2 36 0 0
is φ[1](t) = [c, c]>,∀t ≥ 35, where c is a constant value.
In Table I we show the average value and the standard
deviation of the detection time Td for different values of
c. The samples are obtained using 200 simulations over an
interval t ∈ {0, . . . , 200} for each value of c. In Figure
2 we plot |r[i,h](t)| and the detection threshold r¯[i](t), for
i = 1, . . . , 5 and c = 0.125, and we can see that the attack
is immediately detected by subsystem Σ2 (red line).
Secondly, we show how the detection time changes if the
attack function affects the communicated measurements in
an incipient way, rather than abruptly. The attack function
is therefore modeled as φ[1](t) = (1 − γ(Ta[1]−t))[c, c]>.
The results are summarized in Table II, with γ = 1.001,
for different values of c.
B. Stealthy attack
We now show the case in which the attacker takes control
of multiple communication links connecting subsystem 2
with its neighbors, specifically N̂2 = {1, 3}, and through
perfect knowledge of A21 and A23 is able to design a stealthy
attack. Hence functions φ[1](t) and φ[3](t) are designed such
that col(φ[j]|j ∈ {1, 3}) ∈ ker ([A21, A23]). We show the
result of this attack in Figure 3 and Figure 4a. As expected,
attack detection fails, as the attack functions are designed
to satisfy (14), and the attacker is able to move the states
away from the consensus value. Finally, we show how it is
possible to design the consensus weight matrices αij so that
stealthy attacks do not influence the consensus. To ensure that
any stealthy attack satisfies φ¯i ∈ ker
[
αij1 , . . . , αij|Ni|
]
, we
design the weight matrices as[




Aij1 , . . . , Aij|Ni|
]
. (17)
Matrix Wi must be such that the resulting α = [αij ] ,∀i, j ∈
N is row-stochastic and primitive. In the example, to ensure
row-stochasticity of α, we design Wi as a diagonal matrix,






Fig. 2: Time evolution of each component of the absolute
values of the residuals, together with the corresponding de-
tection threshold. For each subsystem i = 1, . . . , 5, |r[i,h](t)|
are represented by solid lines, while r¯[i,h](t) by dashed lines.
Abrupt attack φ[1](t) = [0.125, 0.125]>,∀t ≥ 35 in the
communication link from Σ1 to Σ2. Detection occurs once
|r[2,h](t)| > r¯[2,h](t) is satisfied for at least one component.
Fig. 3: Detection failure in the case of a stealthy attack.
Time evolution of each component of the absolute values
of the residuals, together with the corresponding detection
threshold. For each subsystem i = 1, . . . , 5,
∣∣r[i,h](t)∣∣ are
represented by solid lines, while r¯[i,h](t) by dashed lines.
where Aij,(hl) is the (h, l)-th component of Aij . Moreover,
since in this example the communication graph is strongly
connected, then we can say that the obtained α is primitive.
Using this procedure, we obtain
α12 = [0.5I2] , α14 = [0.5I2] , α21 = [0.3¯I2] , α23 = [0.3¯I2] ,
α25 = [0.3¯I2] , α31 = [0.5I2] , α32 = [0.5I2] , α41 = [0.5I2] ,
α45 = [0.5I2] , α52 = [0.5I2] , α54 = [0.5I2] ,
In Figure 4b we show how applying this design of αij to
the consensus controllers, the effect of the stealthy attack
functions φ[1](t) and φ[3](t) is nullified, whilst maintaining
stability and preserving consensus equilibrium of the system.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper presents some preliminary results for the prob-
lem of detecting cyber-attacks in the communication network
between interconnected subsystems governed by consensus-
based control. A distributed attack detection method is pro-
posed and the detectability properties are analyzed both in
theory and in a simulation example. The theoretical results
are conservative but are a first step in the direction of
designing an effective distributed attack detection scheme.
(a) (b)
Fig. 4: Evolution of states of LSS under stealthy attack with (b) and without (a) the design of the weight matrices of the
consensus αij as in (17). Through the proposed design of the weight matrices of the consensus, the effect of the attack is
nullified, and therefore states remain at consensus equilibrium.
A class of stealthy attacks is identified and some conditions
on the design of the consensus-control layer to cancel the
effect of these attacks on the system dynamics are provided.
As future work, we aim at considering the attack isola-
tion problem in order to identify the communication links
involved by the attack. Furthermore, we will investigate
the opportunity to reconfigure the control law after attack
detection to make the system resilient to attacks. Moreover,
we will further investigate the idea to reduce the effect
of stealthy attacks on the dynamics of the interconnected
subsystems, while guaranteeing the convergence conditions
for the consensus-based secondary control scheme.
Finally, in future work, the application of the proposed
approach will be validated on a micro-grid use-case.
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